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ABSTRACT 
This analysis considers the UK Privy Council judgment in the Fishermen and Friends of the Sea case – 
an appeal from Trinidad and Tobago. The case is noteworthy both because it provides a relatively 
rare judicial consideration of one of the core environmental principles – the polluter pays principle –– 
and because it is an unusual example of a successful principles-based challenge brought by an 
environmental NGO. My analysis locates the Privy Council’s consideration of the principle within the 
separation of powers doctrine. I argue that, largely due to this doctrine, while the case is fascinating 
for its policy discussion of the polluter pays principle in relation to water pollution permit charging, it 
is ultimately not particularly useable as a precedent by environmental lawyers in jurisdictions beyond 
Trinidad and Tobago. Nevertheless, the case potentially offers some instructive lessons for the UK 
post-Brexit, where former EU environmental principles look set to be ‘coming home’. 
KEYWORDS: Polluter pays principle, water pollution, permit charging, Trinidad and Tobago, Brexit, 
environmental principles 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The current case involved an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the UK Privy Council from the Court 
of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago (T&T). Somewhat appropriately for an environmental case, it was 
also the first video-link hearing from the court’s base in Parliament Square, London. The appeal was 
brought against the T&T Minister of Planning, Housing and the Environment by the environmental 
NGO, Fishermen and Friends of the Sea, which was challenging the application of the polluter pays 
principle in relation to cost-recovery charging for the regulation of water pollution. 
Lord Carnwath began the judgment with a general summary of what the polluter pays principle is 
about: 
The Polluter Pays Principle (‘PPP’ or ‘the Principle’) is now firmly established as a basic 
principle of international and domestic environmental laws. It is designed to achieve the 
‘internalization of environmental costs’, by ensuring that the costs of pollution control and 
remediation are borne by those who cause the pollution, and thus reflected in the costs of 
their goods and services, rather than borne by the community at large.1 
                                                          
* The author thanks the anonymous referee for their helpful comments. 
1 Fishermen and Friends of the Sea (Appellant) v The Minister of Planning, Housing and the Environment 
(Respondent) (Trinidad and Tobago) [2017] UKPC 37 (‘Fishermen and Friends of the Sea’) [2]. 
He also drew attention to the inherent uncertainties in the principle, including who should pay, what 
they should pay for, and how much they should pay.2 These areas of uncertainty are very much a 
feature of discussion in the case, which involves how the polluter pays principle might shape the fee 
payable by a water pollution permit holder. The ‘who’ here is obvious, but the ‘what’ and ‘how 
much’ far less so. Are permit holders simply paying a contribution towards the water pollution 
regulator’s costs of preventive monitoring and enforcement? If so, should the level of this 
contribution vary based on the polluting amounts discharged to water, or should it be a flat fee? And 
should there be an extra sum paid to cover a generic clean-up fund if prevention fails and a pollution 
incident occurs? These are some of the questions touched on by the case. However, as we shall see, 
anyone looking for a substantive blueprint from the Privy Council on how such a charging scheme 
should be drawn up so as to be in accordance with the PPP is likely to be disappointed.  The 
judgment may touch on these questions, but it does not really answer them. What we get instead is 
a classic, measured judicial review analysis of what the T&T Minister was legally required to do 
under the terms of T&T law and whether he had acted in accordance with that law. 
2. THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Section 31 of the Environmental Management Act 2000 requires the Environmental Management 
Authority and all other governmental entities to conduct their operations and programmes in 
accordance with the Trinidad & Tobago National Environmental Policy (NEP).3 This section clearly 
applied to the Minister of Planning, Housing and the Environment in the present case. 
Paragraph 2.3 of the T&T statutory NEP states: 
Polluter Pays Principle 
A key principle of pollution control policy is that the cost of preventing pollution or of 
minimising environmental damage due to pollution will be borne by those responsible for 
pollution. The principle seeks to accomplish the optimal allocation of limited resources. 
Important elements of the principle are: 
(a) Charges are levied as an application or processing fee, purchase price of a licence or 
permit, which entitle the holder to generate specific quantities of pollutants; and 
(b) Money collected will be used to correct environmental damage. 
As noted by Lord Carnwath, the central issue in the case was whether the Ministerial regulations by 
which charges for water pollution licences were fixed were consistent with this aspect of the NEP 
and in particular sub-paragraph 2.3(b). 
The T&T Water Pollution Rules 2001 established a permitting system for regulating water pollution. 
Under rule 8, those who release a water pollutant outside the permissible level that is likely to cause 
harm to human health or to the environment will be notified of the need to apply for a permit. A 
person granted a permit is then required to pay ‘the prescribed fee’.4 This fee is the one prescribed 
                                                          
2 ibid [4] quoting Burnett-Hall on Environmental Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 91. 
3 Drawn up by the Authority, after public consultation, and requiring Ministerial approval (under s 18 of the 
Environmental Management Act 2000). 
4 Rule 8(2). 
by the Minister under section 96(2) of the Environmental Management Act 2000,5 which provides 
him with the power to make regulations determining ‘the amount of charges and fees payable to the 
Authority for or in relation to applications, licences, permits …’.6 
Using this power, the Minister made the Water Pollution (Fees) Regulations 2001,7 which prescribed 
the fees payable to apply for and maintain a water pollution permit. The principal fee took the form 
of a fixed annual permit fee of TT$10,000 for the period of the permit.8 There was no variation in this 
fee according to the type or amount of pollution permitted. 
The Minister settled on this approach from a range of permit fee models which had been explored in 
collaboration with US expertise. He had effectively chosen ‘Model 2’, described in the T&T Court of 
Appeal as follows:9 
This model suggests an identification of the total permitting cost on a yearly basis and an 
estimate of the number of permits that the [Authority] anticipate will be issued. The total 
permitting cost is divided by the anticipated number of permits and the resulting figure is 
deemed to be the permitting cost. 
This is a simple model that will be quite easy to administer. However, it suffers from several 
inherent deficiencies such as the failure to distinguish between ability to pay; lack of 
consideration of pollution profile and load profile; and impact of pollutant on the 
environment. 
Model 2 thus lies at the basic end of the spectrum, with a simple division of the regulatory agency’s 
costs by the number of permit holders. Another potential model that was not adopted by the 
Minister – ‘Model 6’ – was based on pollution loads and represented a contrasting and ambitious 
approach to permitting fees: 
The pollution load model is perhaps the most suitable one for ensuring that the 
environmental imperatives are satisfied together with the cost recovery requirement of the 
permitting agency. Basically, this model operates on several levels. 
Essentially, the Fees paid are based on those pollutants included in the permit; the 
environmental harm caused by the pollutants discharged; the quantity of the pollutants 
discharged and the quality of the water receiving the discharge. This method of setting 
permit fees is big in Wisconsin and the state has been effective in achieving full recovery of 
its cost … 
This Wisconsin model is quite useful as it provides equity in the sense that the polluter pays 
according to discharge load … In addition by considering where discharge is taking place, 
                                                          
5 Rule 2. 
6 Environmental Management Act 2000, s 96(2)(a). 
7 These were subsequently amended by The Water Pollution (Fees) (Amendment) Regulations 2006. However 
the core basis of the fee structure remained the same. 
8 Rule 8(2). 
9 [6] of the Court of Appeal judgment, quoted in Fishermen and Friends of the Sea [21]. 
measures can be taken to protect more sensitive water zones. Finally, basing a model on 
load based pollution ensures full implementation of the polluter pay principle.10 
Detail on the full range of models is not particularly relevant for the purposes of the current analysis, 
or indeed for that of the Privy Council, which singled out mainly these two models11 – the first 
because it was the one chosen by the T&T authorities, and the other representing the ideal PPP 
version called for by the appellants. 
The appellants’ claim queried whether the polluter pays principle (as set out in paragraph 2.3 of the 
NEP) had been properly used in drawing up the annual permit fees under the regulations. They 
argued that the flat, fixed fee of TT$10,000 showed that it had not been (because such a structure 
was in breach of the PPP) and that the regulations were therefore unlawful and should be 
withdrawn.12 
3. THE BOARD’S JUDGMENT 
The Privy Council Board drew explicit attention to para 2.3 of the NEP, which, as we have seen, 
states that the PPP requires there to be charges for permits and that the money raised will be used 
to correct environmental damage. It then asked:13 
Is it sufficient that the fees are assessed on the basis of full recovery only of the operating 
costs of the authority, including the administration of the permit scheme? Or should they 
also allow for an additional amount to be used by the Authority itself ‘to correct 
environmental damage’? 
The appellants argued that, under the chosen flat fee model, no fees collected were being used to 
correct environmental damage. They effectively claimed that only a Model 6-type approach would 
enable this, given that the costs associated with rectifying environmental damage vary ‘according to 
the pollution load, pollutant profile, sensitivity of receiving environment and toxicity.’14 
Counsel for the Minister, in contrast, argued that the act of regulating polluters, requiring them to 
have a permit and to be subject to its conditions, amounted to the Authority acting ‘to correct 
environmental damage’ and that its activity in this regard ‘is funded by money collected from fees’.15 
Accordingly, the letter of the Policy was being complied with. 
The Board of the Privy Council disagreed with the latter view. It held that sub-paragraph (b) of 
paragraph 2.3 (‘Money collected will be used to correct environmental damage’) must be given 
separate effect. This provision was not directed to the general purpose of the permitting system or 
to the implementation of permit conditions, but rather to the use by the Authority of the money 
collected by way of fees in order to correct environmental damage. 
                                                          
10 Quoted in Fishermen and Friends of the Sea [23].  
11 Model 5, which was volume-based was also briefly discussed: Fishermen and Friends of the Sea [22]. While 
volume is in some senses a proxy for pollution, it is only rather crudely so and thus lacks the refinement of a 
true pollution load model (as in Model 6). 
12 Fishermen and Friends of the Sea [27] and [30]. 
13 ibid [37]. 
14 ibid [38]. 
15 ibid [40]. 
However, the Board could hardly be said to have endorsed the former view (arguing for a Model 6 
approach) either. It left much more room for Ministerial discretion than that. As Lord Carnwath 
held:16 
the NEP does not specify the extent of provision to be made for future correction activities 
of the Authority, nor its form. Those are matters for the judgement of the Minister. 
However, sub-paragraph (b) is identified as an important aspect of the NEP, which cannot 
lawfully be ignored. As far as can be judged from the material available to the Board, it was 
left wholly out of account in setting the prescribed fee … There is no reference to this aspect 
of paragraph 2.3 in the evidence filed on behalf of the Minister [being taken into account in 
setting the fees]. 
The only reasonable inference therefore was that paragraph 2.3 had been ignored. That meant that 
the regulations failed to comply with the NEP and were thus in breach of the Minister’s duty under 
section 31 of the Environmental Management Act 2000. 
4. ANALYSIS 
Environmental principles, in terms of judicial application, have never quite lived up to their promise 
from an environmental point of view. They are Janus-faced tools that have as often been used by 
industry as by the environmental movement. That is particularly true in an EU law context, where 
judicial review challenges based on various EU environmental principles, including polluter pays,17 
are very much the province of industry.18 Furthermore, some of them are less commonly aired in 
court than others. The precautionary principle, for example, is relatively frequently litigated, 
whereas an appearance by the polluter pays principle is much rarer. Fishermen and Friends of the 
Sea is therefore notable in at least two respects: it is a case brought by an environmental NGO and it 
is based on the polluter pays principle. The fact that it was decided by an apex court provides the 
icing on an already unusual cake. 
In some respects, one of the most interesting elements of the case turns out to be juridically of little 
relevance –  its discussion of the policy context to Trinidad and Tobago’s choices on cost-recovery 
charging for water pollution permits. Although they got the law wrong in the end and lost the 
appeal, one nevertheless comes away impressed with how rigorously the T&T government engaged 
in research on the various models for permit fees and their compatibility with the PPP. One can only 
hope that the UK government treats environmental principles as assiduously post-Brexit (British exit 
from the European Union)19– an issue that is considered further below. 
                                                          
16 ibid [43]. 
17 Eg Case C-293/97 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Standley [1999] ECR I-2603. The 
precautionary principle is the environmental principle most commonly employed by industry in EU law. 
18 In Standley, the ‘industry’ was farming. This industry dominance in the EU reflects strict standing rules 
before the Court of Justice which particularly prejudice environmental NGOs. 
19 See UK Human Rights Blog, David Hart QC, ‘Polluter Pays Principle: in Tobago, in the EU/UK, and in UK post-
Brexit’ <https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2017/12/01/polluter-pays-principle-in-tobago-in-the-eu-uk-and-in-
uk-post-brexit/> (accessed 15 June 2018). On Brexit and environmental principles, see further Brexit & 
Environment Blog, Eloise Scotford, ‘Environmental Principles as Legal Foundations of UK Environmental Policy: 
Bedrocks or Minefields?’ <https://www.brexitenvironment.co.uk/2018/07/30/environmental-principles-legal-
foundations-uk-environmental-policy-bedrocks-minefields/> (accessed 7 August 2018). 
The T&T NEP’s instantiation of the PPP required the cost of preventing pollution or of minimising 
environmental damage to be borne by those responsible. It also emphasised the need for permit 
charging and spending of money collected on correcting environmental damage. Of course, as 
adverted to in the case,20 a permit system with conditions in itself reflects the PPP in that polluters 
are obliged to pay for the cost of pollution control equipment in order to meet their permit 
conditions. In relation to the permit charging element, as we saw earlier, the appellants read this as 
requiring something like Model 6, with permit fees based directly on pollution loads; the T&T 
government read it as requiring only a permit-based system with charging to recover the overall 
system costs (as the permit-based system itself ‘corrects environmental damage’); and the Privy 
Council interpreted it as needing a separate spend (beyond the permit system itself) on correcting 
environmental damage. In truth, however, the Board’s view is much closer to the T&T government 
approach than to the appellants’ one. It would presumably have been fine for the government to 
keep their cost-recovery charging system more or less as it stood, but to add a small additional fee 
to everyone’s permit to cater for clean-up or remediation after pollution incidents. The latter would 
fulfil the NEP’s requirement for spending the money on correcting environmental damage, assuming 
that ‘spending the money’ means spending some rather than all of the collected permit fees on this. 
One also assumes that ‘correcting’ would be interpreted broadly. What, for example, if the Authority 
deployed a boom after an oil spill to contain the oil and to stop it from polluting (or further polluting) 
a watercourse? Would this be ‘correcting’ environmental damage that has occurred or ‘preventing’ 
it from happening in the first place? It should of course be included in permissible spending, with 
‘correcting’ interpreted expansively so as to enable this. 
The case provides a useful illustration of the separation of powers at work. In her book on 
environmental principles,21 Eloise Scotford usefully sets out the various ways in which environmental 
principles, including the PPP, operate. They have a policy use in that they guide governments in 
implementing policy.22 They also have a legal use where they are applied in courts. In the latter 
context, they can be used to interpret legislation, particularly where that legislation is vague or has 
gaps;23 they can also be used to challenge the exercise of government discretionary action (or 
inaction) in relation to the environment.24 The two are of course then related. For constitutional 
separation of powers reasons, courts are often wary of interfering with government policy, the 
choice of which is seen as one for elected representatives and their accountable agents (regulators) 
and not for the courts.25 
This constitutional backdrop is important when considering some key legal issues concerning 
environmental law principles. One such issue is whether principles like the PPP are justiciable in a 
freestanding way when challenging the exercise of government discretion. Thus, can I independently 
challenge any government policy on the basis of the environmental principles?26 What, for example, 
                                                          
20 Fishermen and Friends of the Sea [31] and [39]. 
21 Eloise Scotford, Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law (Hart 2017). 
22 ibid 34. 
23 ibid 147. 
24 ibid 166. The current case obviously involves this latter one. 
25 ibid 132-133. 
26 ibid 117, 261, 264, noting this as a particular issue within EU law. See also Richard Macrory, ‘Principles into 
Practice’, in Richard Macrory (ed), Principles of European Environmental Law (Europa Law Publishing 2004) 3, 
6. 
if I felt that government inaction on tackling air pollution from wood-burning stoves was in breach of 
the PPP? Or can I rely on them only where the government has acted with the relevant principle in 
mind and hence is explicitly intending to implement it?27 The role of the court is then to encourage 
the government to stick to what it has intended. The current appeal does not answer this question 
because it does not need to – it is a clear example of the latter, which is the uncontroversial option 
for the justiciability of environmental principles. The former, freestanding option opens up much 
more room for challenging government policy, which the EU courts in particular have tended to shy 
away from. If the recent Mott ruling is anything to go by, the UK Supreme Court is also wary.28 
However, one might want to distinguish less determinate principles such as the PPP and sustainable 
development from other, more determinate principles, which arguably lend themselves much more 
to being used on a freestanding basis. Principles such as the non-deterioration principle29 and 
perhaps also the precautionary principle could be placed into the latter category. This inevitably 
begs the question of why some principles are more determinate than others. It is to this that we 
now turn. 
On the legal determinacy of environmental principles, the critical issue is whether the courts can and 
will set out their own version of a particular principle. In other words, can and will they provide what 
are typically vague principles with substantive content, or will they allow the executive to follow its 
own interpretation of the relevant principle? In EU law, the Court of Justice (especially the General 
Court)30 –– has set out much more detail for the precautionary principle than for the other 
environmental law principles. Despite de Sadeleer’s hope,31 it seems unlikely that the courts will 
spell out the parameters of the polluter pays principle in the same way. That is in part because its 
application is so area-specific – what the PPP means in the context of water pollution permit 
charging is very different to how it might apply in relation to, for example, contaminated land.32 It is 
no surprise therefore that, in the current Fishermen and Friends of the Sea case, Lord Carnwath 
provided only a relatively modest and uncontroversial definition of the polluter pays principle at the 
start of the judgment. Recognising it as a rather indeterminate principle, he did not lay down a 
detailed account of how it should apply in the specific context of water pollution permit charging; 
that was very much left to the T&T executive. 
In other words, not all environmental law principles operate similarly in terms of how a court might 
fill out their content. With the precautionary principle, detail has been provided by the Court of 
Justice and this is important in the context of the various EU risk regulation regimes. However, one 
reason that the Court has been bold on this principle is that it has taken many of its cues from the 
                                                          
27 Most EU case law on environmental principles can be understood as constitutionally limited in this way: 
Scotford (n 21) 117-118. On distinguishing between inaction and action, see Gerd Winter, ‘The Legal Nature of 
Environmental Principles in International, EC and German Law’, in Macrory (n 26) 11, 22-23. 
28 R (Mott) v Environment Agency [2018] UKSC 10. Counsel for the Agency, James Maurici QC, argued that to 
provide compensation to a salmon fisherman deprived of his (damaging) livelihood due to habitats protection 
would be contrary to the PPP: [29]. However in his judgment in that court, Lord Carnwath did not take up 
discussion of the principle at all. 
29 See eg Case C-461/13 Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland v Germany (2015) EU:C:2015:433. 
30 Scotford (n 21) 184. 
31 Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002) 60: ‘it is up 
to legal doctrine progressively to add the finishing touches that will clarify the definition and scope of the 
[polluter pays] principle’. 
32 Scotford (n 21) 150-151. 
Commission’s own policy work on it.33 In separation of powers terms, the Court is therefore not 
stepping out too far on its own. Another is that, despite applying across a number of risk regimes, 
the precautionary principle tends to hold to a core meaning: it does not vary much in its application 
to particular contexts.34 The PPP and the principle of sustainable development are, in contrast, more 
‘postmodern’ principles in de Sadeleer’s sense.35 They apply across many more settings (not being 
confined to a risk context) and their application does not hold to a core meaning across those 
settings.36 The current Fishermen and Friends of the Sea case clearly illustrates this: how the PPP 
applies in the water pollution permit charging context is rather specific and open to many legitimate 
interpretations (with government reasonably able to choose between either Model 2 or Model 6 for 
example, so long as the core aspects of the NEP’s version of the PPP are respected). 
The approach to environmental law principles may thus be interventionist (with the courts spelling 
them out in depth) or non-interventionist (with the courts leaving interpretation largely to the 
executive). Even a non-interventionist approach may have a backstop however. Thus a court may be 
prepared to intervene if a government’s interpretation of a principle is so unreasonable that no 
reasonable decision-maker could have come to it (in a Wednesbury unreasonable or manifest error 
sense). The Board in the current case was non-interventionist. It did not set out more than a bare 
definition of the principle and it did not intervene with the T&T government’s interpretation of the 
principle as applied to permit charging – either when set out in paragraph 2.3 of the NEP or in its 
choice of the more basic PPP-respecting Model 2. If T&T wanted a less advanced charging model, 
better suited to its capacity as a developing country, then that was fine. The Privy Council was not 
going to make them adopt the more technically demanding Model 6 on the basis that only that one 
model or definition truly accorded with the PPP. 
After interpretation of the principle (including an interpretive application to a context such as permit 
charging), there is then the matter of legally reviewing its implementation in practice. Again, the 
question here is whether the courts will adopt an intensive approach to judicial review, holding the 
executive to its own promises on the principle, or if they will take a more hands-off stance, allowing 
it room to treat its promises rather loosely. On this element in the current case, the Privy Council 
Board adopted a relatively hands-on, illegality approach: in applying its own interpretation of the 
PPP, the T&T executive had committed an error of law by neglecting to provide for a sum to correct 
environmental damage which they themselves had said that the PPP required in the charging 
context. The Board could, conceivably, have treated paragraph 2.3 as mere guidance (set out in a 
policy document, albeit on a statutory footing),37 but rejected this less interventionist approach.38 
                                                          
33 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary 
Principle’ COM (2000) 1 final. See Elizabeth C Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism 
(Hart 2010) ch 6. 
34 Cf Scotford (n 21) 184. Cf also Case C‑ 111/16 Fidenato (2017) EU:C:2017:676. In the latter, while the core 
content of the principle remained that of allowing risk management measures to be taken despite scientific 
uncertainty, the case involved variation in the application of the precautionary principle to GMOS insofar as 
particular legislative procedural rules had been established for Member States wishing to impose emergency 
measures in that policy area. 
35 de Sadeleer (n 31) 273. 
36 de Sadeleer for example, characterises the PPP as ‘elusive’ (n 31) 60, and Scotford describes sustainable 
development as ‘more amorphous’ (n 21) 192. 
37 See the T&T government’s argument: Fishermen and Friends of the Sea [40]. 
38 ibid [41]. 
Many of the above issues – including variation among environmental law principles; differences 
between interpretation, application and implementation; and the degree of court intervention and 
intensity of review – will be of particular interest to a UK audience in the context of Brexit. Section 
16(1) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 sets out that:  
The Secretary of State must, within the period of six months beginning with the day on 
which this Act is passed, publish a draft Bill consisting of— 
(a) a set of environmental principles, 
(b) a duty on the Secretary of State to publish a statement of policy in relation to the 
application and interpretation of those principles in connection with the making and 
development of policies by Ministers of the Crown, 
(c) a duty which ensures that Ministers of the Crown must have regard, in circumstances 
provided for by or under the Bill, to the statement mentioned in paragraph (b). 
A consultation document on this draft Bill was issued in May 2018, with consultation closing on 2 
August and the Bill due to be published in autumn 2018.39 The draft Environmental Principles and 
Governance Bill will be accompanied by a new statutory policy statement on environmental 
principles to be drawn up under it. 
What then is the key lesson from the Fishermen and Friends of the Sea case for the duties in 
paragraphs (b) and (c) above, to which the new Bill will give effect? Given that there is little to 
separate the UK Supreme Court from the Privy Council compositionally, one can conclude for now 
that our courts are unlikely to flesh out the principles much themselves in terms of application to 
particular environmental policy areas. On that count, they can generally be expected to defer to 
government. However, the courts are likely to insist that legislative wording is followed. In that 
respect, the new Environmental Principles and Governance Bill and its associated statutory policy 
statement on environmental principles provide a good starting point. However (depending on the 
wording of the new Bill), the levels of ambition and specificity in all future substantive 
environmental legislation and policy in their reference to principles also seems crucial. Without a 
connected and coherent legislative basis for incorporating environmental principles into UK 
environmental legislation generally, the promise of a post-Brexit replacement of EU accountability 
mechanisms with home-grown British ones may turn out to be a hollow one. Existing legislation and 
policy will also need revisiting. A brief look at just English environmental permitting charging reveals 
that there is much work to be done on that front. Unlike Trinidad and Tobago, England’s charging 
scheme and guidance make no mention of the polluter pays principle.40 The 2017 consultation paper 
that preceded the current scheme mentioned the principle only once in relation to EU emissions 
trading system (ETS) charging and that was to propose abandoning a distinction between the largest 
and smaller emitters that the principle previously supported.41 Absent a mention of the PPP in 
                                                          
39 Defra, Environmental Principles and Governance after the United Kingdom leaves the European Union 
Consultation on environmental principles and accountability for the environment (May 2018). 
40 The Environment Agency (Environmental Permitting) (England) Charging Scheme 2018 and ‘Environmental 
permitting charges guidance’ https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/environmental-permitting-
charges-guidance/environmental-permitting-charges-guidance> (accessed 7 August 2018). 
41 Environment Agency, Environment Agency Charge proposals from 2018 (2017) 52. 
relevant substantive legislation and policy, it seems unlikely that we will see litigants able to mobilise 
the principle in court in the way seen in the current T&T case and in other jurisdictions.42  
5. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the Fishermen and Friends of the Sea case tells us everything and yet nothing about the 
polluter pays principle. This is not meant as a disrespectful comment on the judgment, which is as 
elegant and tightly reasoned as one has come to expect from Lord Carnwath. It is more a statement 
of the inevitable limitations of examining the PPP in a particular jurisdictional context – here Trinidad 
and Tobago. As Scotford rightly observes, case law on the environmental principles tends to be very 
much legislation and policy wording, and thus jurisdictionally, -specific.43 Hence, we learn everything 
about the PPP in an interesting policy-application sense because we see the background to T&T’s 
choices concerning the principle in relation to permit charging. But that is ultimately not justiciable 
material. Much as they might like to be able to, environmental lawyers elsewhere cannot argue, in 
future cases, that the PPP requires something akin to Model 6-based fees.  
However, at the same time we learn nothing, because the whole of the Fishermen and Friends of the 
Sea case really just turns on the T&T government ignoring specific wording (spending collected fees 
on correcting environmental damage), which is extremely unlikely to be found elsewhere in another 
jurisdiction. In the end, as Scotford elegantly puts it: ‘The transnational turn related to 
environmental principles is one of normative inspiration rather than cascading legalisation.’44 The 
case, in other words, serves principally as an encouragement, but not as a readily transplantable 
blueprint on the polluter pays principle. That said, in a UK Brexit context, the case does provide 
some tantalising food for thought as to how, in general terms, our courts might approach the 
proposed new legislative duties on environmental principles. Trinidad and Tobago’s authorities 
were, in many ways, a thoughtful watchdog in applying T&T’s version of the polluter pays principle, 
so the Privy Council perhaps felt able to adopt more of a poodle approach in its review. If the UK 
government lives up to its promises on post-Brexit principles and accountability, then we can 
probably expect a similarly non-aggressive stance by our own courts. If, on the other hand, the 
government comes up with a poodle in the way in which the proposed environmental principles 
framework operates in practice, then one might expect the UK Supreme Court to adopt a more 
interventionist, watchdog role. 
 
                                                          
42 eg Belgium (including in relation to discharge charging), see Luc Lavrysen, ‘European Environmental Law 
Principles in Belgian Jurisprudence’ in Macrory (n 26) 75. 
43 Scotford (n 21) 263-264. 
44 ibid 264. 
